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Abstract
This article studies the ideological reactions of communist regimes to the advent of a post-
communist world. It examines two cases of reformed communist regimes (China and
Vietnam) with two relatively unreformed cases (North Korea and Cuba) to understand
different legitimation strategies employed during and after the downfall of the Soviet
Union. Theoretically, the article compares two ideal-type approaches to ideology in
autocratic regimes. The first approach emphasizes semantic ‘freezing’ over time. The
consistency and coherence of ideology is underlined. The second approach argues that the
success of an ideology lies in its ability to be a dynamic, adaptive force that can react with
changing circumstances. Four parameters help to distinguish the freeze-frame end from
the adaptation pole: (1) the autonomy over semantic changes, (2) the timing, (3) the
velocity and (4) the distance that an ideology moves. Using qualitative case-based analysis
that is enriched with quantitative text analysis of communist party documents, this article
compares these contending conceptions of ideology with each other in the four cases.
Sharing similar starting conditions in the 1970s, the article shows how China and
Vietnam harnessed a flexible legitimation strategy while North Korea and Cuba adopted a
comparatively rigid legitimation approach.
Keywords: authoritarianism; communism; legitimation; ideology; China; North Korea; Cuba; Vietnam
Communism has become an unusual but resilient form of autocratic rule. While
constituting a major ideological orientation for most of the 20th century
(McAdams 2017), contemporary forms of autocratic rule have shifted their legit-
imation patterns away from communism. The modal form of authoritarianism in
the post-Cold War world may indeed be some version of electoral authoritarianism
(Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013). However, the remaining communist
regimes have shown remarkable endurance. Taken together, these governments
have an average lifespan of more than 50 years as of 2018.
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A recent effort to understand the non-collapse of the remaining communist
regimes identifies four domains that bear on their resilience: economic reforms,
measures to co-opt beneficiaries, institutional innovations and ideology (Dimitrov
2013). This article focuses only on the last dimension of Martin Dimitrov’s fourfold
framework: ideology. It provides a comprehensive account of two distinct pathways
taken by surviving communist regimes to legitimate their rule in a post-communist
world. In so doing, the article makes a wider contribution to the study of political
ideologies and autocratic legitimation by proposing a spectrum to conceptualize
and assess the relative adaptability of legitimating ideologies to changing
circumstances.
To be explicit at the very beginning, the article attempts to understand in
structured comparative detail how the legitimation of communist parties in China,
Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea adapted to the ostensible end of global com-
munism.1 Given that we study only successful cases, the article is not able to engage
in a covariational analysis that would allow for causal reasoning about determi-
nants of regime survival. Instead, we strongly advocate the merits of studying the
procedural ‘how’ question intensively and examining the differing pathways these
regimes took.
In this light, the article proposes a theoretical template to distinguish between
two major ideological reactions: freeze-frame and adaptation. While the former
captures a strategy of immobilizing semantic changes and fixing ideological
meaning despite changing circumstances, the latter engages proactively with a
changing environment and adjusts ideological meaning. We introduce four para-
meters that help to distinguish empirically these two basic strategies: (1) autonomy
over semantic changes, (2) timing, (3) velocity and (4) ideological distance.
We demonstrate that the autocratic party-states in China and Vietnam on the
one hand, and North Korea and Cuba on the other, took different approaches to
legitimizing their rule from the 1980s onwards. While all four regimes shared
similar starting conditions in the 1970s, China and Vietnam, amid major reforms
in economic and foreign policy, attempted to legitimate their rule with an adaptive
and dynamic approach to ideology that sought to change alongside non-ideological
developments. Cuba and North Korea took a more rigid approach to legitimation
as the world tilted away from communism and sought instead to retain their
ideologies with less compromise. The ideological adaptations that Pyongyang and
Havana did make during the 1990s were eleventh-hour efforts at regime survival
rather than proactively adaptive. In this sense they were forced capitulations
undertaken from a position of relative weakness while the more pre-emptive and
thoroughgoing adaptations made by China and Vietnam were made by choice as a
strategy to strengthen the foundation for communist party survival in a changing
world. Relatively early experimentations by China and Vietnam with ideological
flexibility made it easier to adapt to changes in the broader communist world in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. The more reactive attempts by North Korea and Cuba
during the 1990s occurred late and made it difficult for each state to introduce
flexibility without undermining its ability to legitimate party rule.
To substantiate these arguments, this article uses three types of evidence. First, it
engages in structured qualitative case-based analysis of relevant political develop-
ments in the late 1980s and early 1990s in each country. Second, it draws on
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qualitative analysis of primary documents and speeches from the government of
each state. Third, it advances arguments using quantitative text analysis of gov-
ernment documents from one case representing each of the hypothesized legit-
imation strategies: China and North Korea. The methods will be described in more
detail but by way of preview the effort involved both frequency analysis (amount of
word usage) and keyword-in-context analysis (how terms relate to one another) to
illuminate the legitimation patterns of each regime.
This article proceeds in four sections. First, a discussion of different conceptions
of legitimation and its role in autocratic resilience will establish the theoretical
relevance of the article. Second, the methodological procedure will be described,
including the process for deriving terms for analysis and selecting texts. Third, the
empirical analysis will be presented in two subsections. An empirical examination
of the efforts by North Korea and Cuba will reveal on the one hand a comparatively
rigid approach to ideological legitimation while the analysis of China and Vietnam
highlights a comparatively adaptable approach to the role of ideology and legit-
imation in sustaining communist party rule. Fourth, the article concludes with
remarks about the wider relevance of this research.
Approaches to ideology and legitimation in contemporary autocracies
It is difficult for leaders to justify ruling a modern state without at least a per-
functory acknowledgement of public participation (see Dahl 1971: 5). This reality
often leads autocratic leaders to justify their rule based on grounds of performance
or temporary expediency or to construct ‘competitive authoritarian’ electoral
systems in which they attempt to manipulate the institutions of democracy to
remain in power (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2013). Yet some modern
autocratic regimes do not base their legitimacy entirely on performance or on
participation and instead construct and propagate ideologies that help explain why
they are entitled to rule and what they intend to do with their power (Barker 2001;
Beetham 1991; Gilley 2009).
Legitimation is understood as one of the crucial pillars of autocratic resilience
(Gerschewski 2013). Autocracies censor the public sphere to shield their legit-
imation messages from public challenge and ultimately to quash the potential for
anti-regime collective action (Dukalskis 2017; King et al. 2013). Of course, if
citizens of autocratic states express support for the dominant ideology, it is difficult
to know if this loyalty is feigned in order to avoid repression, a genuinely held
belief, or something in between (Chwe 1999; Kuran 1997). To answer the question
to what extent the autocratic regime has been successful in promoting a belief in its
legitimacy among its citizens is beyond the scope of this article. However, we take
the legitimacy claim of the regime seriously. We maintain that it is important to
study what autocracies actually say about why they are entitled to rule (Dukalskis
and Gerschewski 2017; Gerschewski 2018). If we set aside the question of belief, the
result of an autocratic government promoting its ideology and censoring deviations
can be to winnow public discourse to such narrow bounds that mustering argu-
ments and information to oppose the government becomes more difficult (Kuran
1997). Furthermore, the ability of an autocratic regime to compel people to per-
form in public as if they believe in its dominant narratives and symbols
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simultaneously demonstrates and reifies the regime’s power, thereby discouraging
collective challenges (Wedeen 1999).
A difficulty of studying legitimation is the definitional ambiguity that surrounds
most key terms necessary to proceed with analysis (Gill 2011). Conceptual essays
on ideology, for example, frequently note that the term’s definition is contested
(Gerring 1997; Maynard and Mildenberger 2018). While the dominant approach in
political research is to treat ideology as a relatively coherent set of political ideas
that can be measured along the familiar left–right spectrum (Knight 2006), this
strategy is of limited utility in helping to explain how and with what effect auto-
cracies deploy ideas, narratives and symbols into a censored and policed public
sphere. By assigning overly strict standards of coherence to ideologies and those
motivated by them, one runs the risk of defining ideology so narrowly that one is
bound to find that its impact is marginal (Jost 2006).
Ideology is often used as a legitimating device, but the question of the extent to
which a legitimating ideology needs to remain coherent and stable is still an open
question. To what degree do autocratic leaders attempt to fix (or at least stabilize)
the meanings of their legitimation efforts in order to achieve consistency in their
messages? Alternatively, how much adaptability do autocratic leaders allow their
legitimation messages to display in order to keep pace with changing realities – and
does the adaptation encompass all spheres of an ideology or is it restricted to
peripheral areas?
To address these theoretical questions in the context of communist autocracies,
this article conceives of legitimation strategies as a continuous spectrum. On one
end is an effort to ‘freeze’ the meaning of legitimating ideologies while on the other
end is a contrasting strategy that sees the content and meaning of legitimating
ideologies adapted to changing circumstances. Both strategies share the singular
aim of keeping the government in power.
The first ideal type is the freeze-frame strategy. This term is borrowed from
Michael Freeden’s ideological analysis. He argues that all political ideologies share a
common morphology of different layers. They have a core and more adjacent
elements.2 They form a ‘macroscopic structural arrangement that attributes
meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts’ (Freeden 1994: 141). In
this sense, an ideology is an assemblage of concepts that are held together. The
crux, however, is that these concepts are most often – in line with Walter Bryce
Gallie (1956) – ‘essentially contested’. Concepts such as freedom, equality and
justice do not have consensual and clear-cut meanings. Instead, the semantics are
manifold and shifting such that they are subject to constant negotiation and
struggle. Different parties are aware of this ‘contestedness’ and use these concepts
in a struggle to settle their meanings.
Freeden argues that the key aim of political ideologies is to make contested
concepts decontested. ‘Ultimately, ideologies are configurations of decontested
meanings of political concepts’ (Freeden 1996: 76). Ideologies therefore strive to
limit semantic variety by stabilizing the meaning of a term in time and space and
reducing any insecurity and rivalry about its proper usage. The term serves as a
‘freeze-frame of the meanings of the concepts employed’ (Freeden 1994: 158). An
ideology assigns clear and unchanging meaning to its constituent concepts. Con-
cepts are no longer free-floating units that could connect to various neighbouring
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concepts, but instead become rigid and pressed into a ‘thought skeleton’ in which
the semantics are limited. They therefore aim to marginalize alternative inter-
pretations of concepts and privilege their own perspectives.
If an ideology is able to impose a fixed and uncontested meaning on its audience
that is unchanging over time, it can acquire a taken-for-granted quality and
become a routinized script for everyday behaviour. In his classic work on the
legitimation of power, David Beetham (1991: 65) argued that the creation of
‘settled expectations’ is one prerequisite for legitimate rule. If legitimacy claims can
‘ensure predictability’, they can produce a following. Only if people can rely on the
validity and the intactness of these claims can they see them as legitimate. Overly
frequent changes of basic claims, in contrast, can undermine the belief of the
people in the legitimacy of the entitlement claims of the rulers. Against this
backdrop, decontesting otherwise contested concepts and freezing their semantics
is one route to legitimizing autocratic rule.
The second ideal type of legitimation that this article suggests is a strategy of
flexible adaptation. In this view, an ideology is seen as a tool that adapts to a
changing environment. If core or adjacent concepts that constitute the ideology,
their relation to each other, or their semantic content changes, then an ideology
reacts and adapts flexibly (Freeden 1996). Instead of ideological rigidity, adaptation
is central.
In his classic functionalist studies, Talcott Parsons (1969) reminded us to see
adaptation as one of the core functions that any social system needs to fulfil. A
society needs to ‘upgrade’ its adaptive capacity. Karl Deutsch (1973: 145–149, 234)
connects the idea of adaptability systematically with the notion of learning capa-
cities. Adaptation contains for him the idea of a direct and unmediated feedback
loop for a certain behaviour. An organization or regime is able to react to a new
and iterating stimulus from outside. By doing so, an inner status is aimed for that
reduces inner disequilibria.
Against this backdrop, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell stressed the
important issues of capacity and agency. Adaptation is about ‘political systems that
“do something” about threats and challenges’ (Almond and Powell 1978: 399). In
this light, we see adaptation not only as a reactive phenomenon, but also as a
proactive steering capacity of systems that demand autonomous room to man-
oeuvre. Proactive adaptation is important as it allows more procedural control.
Besides this autonomy, we introduce three additional parameters that provide
useful criteria to assess the adaptation process. We borrow from Deutsch’s work
the idea of a second-order measurement of adaptation: the velocity by which a
regime learns to learn. It refers to the question of how fast a regime is able to
improve its performance when being confronted with challenges (Deutsch
1973: 240).
Furthermore, we assume that timing and distance matter. Distance refers in this
context to how conceptually far an ideology travels from its original meaning to
adapt to changing environments. How extensive and wide-ranging have the
ideological changes been? Timing, in turn, accounts for when the adaptations
actually occur in the political development of a country. Often, the question of
timing is closely related to the question of autonomy. If the timing of semantic
changes is too late, it usually results in a loss of autonomy. Late-movers that have
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missed the optimal point for adaptation are left only with a defensive and reactive
strategy.
In sum, we distinguish between two poles of legitimation strategies. One strategy
is guided by the attempt to freeze potentially changing semantics and render
contested concepts decontested. Stable expectations are created that ‘sink into’
people’s hearts and minds. The other pole refers to an adaptive strategy in which
the regime adjusts its legitimacy formula to changing circumstances. Four para-
meters help understand the movement from the freeze-frame end of the spectrum
to the adaptation pole: (1) the autonomy over the process, (2) the timing, (3) the
velocity and (4) the distance that an ideology moves.
Shared ideological morphology: nationalized variants of communism
While the freeze-frame idea is a passive and (in the literal sense) conservative
strategy, the adaptation strategy is active and reformist. The world’s remaining
communist regimes provide fruitful empirical material to illustrate these different
strategies of legitimation. The following analysis assumes that each regime in
question wished to remain in power. While Dimitrov (2013) has highlighted other
important factors for communist resilience (see also Saxonberg 2013), the focus
here is only on demonstrating the different pathways that regimes attempted to
take in legitimating their rule. We do not aim to provide a causal argument based
on covariation but take a procedural perspective in order to understand these
pathways.
As the cases shared similar starting conditions, they are apt for demonstrating
the diverging paths that they took subsequently. All of the parties in question, the
Chinese and Vietnamese on the one hand and the Cuban and North Korean on the
other, were created in a similar period of time and shaped during the Cold War
period. They shared similar political and social conditions in the 1970s, the starting
date of our analysis. However, during and after the collapse of Soviet communism
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the ostensible victory of liberal democracy
and capitalism, the world’s communist regimes faced choices about how to legit-
imate their rule. They could hold firm and maintain that they were the last bastions
of national communism in an increasingly dangerous world or, alternatively, they
could adapt and base their legitimacy on some modified conceptual constellation.
These approximate the ideal types of freeze-framing ideological meaning and
adapting ideological concepts to legitimate autocratic rule.
These regimes share a common ideological morphology: a nationalized variant
of communism. The core of the regime legitimizing formula in all four countries
has been a form of nationalism-cum-communism. From the beginning, all of the
respective country leaders emphasized a national Sonderweg, a creative application
of the communist orthodoxy to national circumstances. Indeed, this was a more
general phenomenon within the communist world and proved to be a crucial
element in the sustainability of virtually all independent communist regimes
(McAdams 2017). The ideology was a mixture of both a national delineation from
communism and a heavy reliance on its dogmas. The ideological core of all four
countries is therefore a blend between the key concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘com-
munism’ with the task of legitimating the entitlement claims of the ruling
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communist party. The party is propagated as the vanguard and due to its excep-
tional foresight, it is the legitimate force that should lead the people. What changes
over time, however, is the respective weight that is given to either communism or
nationalism in the effort to legitimate party rule.
Of course, nationalism and communism have presented themselves in myriad
ways and have developed over time, with enormous scholarly literatures under-
pinning each. This article relies on the Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies
(Freeden et al. 2013) to lend content to the terms ‘communism’ and ‘nationalism’
and to constituent terms that can be coded in the quantitative text analysis and
examined in the qualitative analysis performed below. The entries in the Handbook
have been explicitly designed to distil the main features of the respective ideologies.
Archie Brown (2013: 371) puts forward the distinctive characteristics of ‘com-
munist ideology in power’. He argues that besides the aforementioned vanguard
position of the party, communist regimes in power secondly proffered democratic
centralism within the party even if it was in practice often more about power
politics and strategic co-optation. Thirdly, state ownership of the means of pro-
duction is essential to the communist idea. Fourthly and closely interlinked to the
third characteristic is the centrally planned economy that was perceived as being
more just and more efficient than the market economy (Brown 2009: 110–114,
2013: 371–377). With these four common features of communism (party as van-
guard, democratic centralism, state ownership, centrally planned economy) in
mind, the terms listed in Figure 1 under ‘communism’ are understood as adjacent
to the core concept.
In a similar vein, Andrew Vincent (2013: 463) has tried to synthesize the
‘regulative themes of nationalist ideologies’. He puts forward six features that can
be seen as adjacent to the core of nationalism. Firstly, nationalism is based on an
understanding that humanity can be fragmented into distinct groups with distinct
ethnicities; secondly, a strong sense of common identity is linked to it; thirdly, a
nation is often identified with territorial boundaries; fourthly, it is often associated
with sovereignty; fifthly, a nation invokes strong feelings of a common culture in
which universal values are embedded; sixthly, nations are self-determining entities
that seek their own prosperity and should aim to guarantee the secure development
and prosperity of their citizens (Vincent 2013: 463–470). The terms in Figure 1
were derived with these six features in mind (ethnicity, identity, territory, sover-
eignty, culture and prosperity) and are taken as adjacent to the core of nationalism.
Empirical analysis: communist legitimation in a changing world
The main idea behind the text analysis is to detect changes in the semantics of
concepts over time.3 In sum, the freeze-frame strategy would be to keep initial
semantics intact without significant shifts. The adaptive strategy, in contrast, would
be responsive to external changes and would incorporate semantic shifts. Like a
seismograph for societal change, the adaptive strategy works best if it is able to
react by shifting meaning before the damage is done.
For text analysis of North Korea, all available New Year’s messages from 1981 to
2012 in English using official North Korean translations were collected and ana-
lysed. These messages can be understood as yearly programmatic texts that
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summarize past achievements and future aspirations. They are jointly edited by the
main official organs and can be seen as a consensual text of the forces within the
ruling bloc. In this light, they are comparable to the documents the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) publishes after the end of its regular party congresses held
every five years. The CCP reports under study rely on official CCP English-
language translations and span from 1977 to 2012.
Relevant documents were digitized and preprocessed to delete punctuation and
stopgap words. The word count matrix of the text corpora was then analysed for
frequency rates and for keywords in context. The main idea behind this approach is
to measure salience and association: the more often a term co-occurs in the direct
neighbourhood4 of identified key terms the more influential it is to that idea or
concept. We identify words that appear constantly in the direct neighbourhood of
this semantic conglomerate of ‘nation’ and ‘communism’ and interpret the chan-
ging patterns over time.5
The analysis illustrates the logics of both approaches to legitimation; that is, the
freeze-frame and adaptability strategies. North Korea and Cuba were chosen as
typical cases of relatively unreformed communism in the post-Cold War period to
probe attempts at a freeze-frame strategy. China and Vietnam were chosen as cases
of reformed communist systems that attempted to introduce more robustly flex-
ibility and adaptability into their legitimating formulas. It must be stressed that the
freeze-frame and adaptability strategies to legitimation are Weberian ideal types. It
is thus not the case that in their efforts to be adaptable China and Vietnam
Legitimation of the entitlement claim of the Communist Party
as the locus of power
Nationalized variant of
communism













Figure 1. Key Terms for Nationalism and Communism
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jettisoned everything relating to communism, nor is it the case that North Korea
and Cuba employed completely static legitimation strategies over time. Rather, the
pairs of cases can be seen as existing on a spectrum closer to one ideal-typical
strategy or the other.
Text analysis is only performed for China and North Korea to illustrate the ideal
type of each approach to legitimation. Space constraints as well as availability of
comparable English-language texts over time able to be digitized preclude
additional text analysis of Vietnam and Cuba, but qualitative analysis of each case
reveals similar approaches to legitimation as China and North Korea, respec-
tively. The time frame of our text analysis is focused on the developments from
the 1980s until 2012. However, the case narratives provide more background
information on the historical setting and the conclusion discusses implications
for today.
Towards the ideal type of freeze-framed legitimation: North Korea and Cuba
North Korea and Cuba can be seen as prime examples of regimes that attempted to
freeze-frame legitimating concepts. By so doing, they endeavoured to provide
stable reference points to facilitate an internalized, unchallenged and dogmatic
interpretation of a legitimating ideology. Communism Cuban and North Korean
style attempted to offer an orthodox route through a semantic map of essentially
contested concepts. Nation, independence and sovereignty, as well as communism,
socialism, solidarity and equality are all concepts whose meaning can change with
the spatiotemporal context. However, Cuba and North Korea worked to freeze
their meaning and produce stable expectations – both within the elite and vis-à-vis
its population. Only when this strategy became difficult to sustain in the 1990s did
they attempt gradual adaptive changes; however, their autonomy over the adap-
tation process can be questioned and the adaptive velocity was debilitatingly slow.
In terms of timing and sequencing, they learned to learn too late, such that their
adaptations were ‘life sustaining’ rather than ‘capacity enhancing’ (see Deutsch
1973: 145–149).
If one tries to identify the core of North Korea’s Juche ideology, it must be an
almost obsessive focus on the country’s independence (Armstrong 2013; Cumings
1997: 40–41; Oh and Hassig 2000: 17). It is a dogma of self-reliance and autonomy.
The traumatic experience of Japanese colonial rule until the end of World War II,
the violence of the Korean War, and developments during the Cold War can all
help explain this strong desire. Economic self-reliance has been depicted as the
foundation for political independence while military power is upheld as a guar-
antor of national sovereignty.
Text analysis helps to illustrate legitimation efforts in North Korea over time.
Figure 2 plots the absolute frequency of nationalist and communist terms
against each other over time.6 One can see an oscillation of the respective usage
of nationalist and communist discourses. While most of the time they parallel
each other, we see a peak of nationalistic claims in the 1990s that can be
explained by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In times of crisis, reference to the
nation seemed to be safer than relying on the fading fortunes of international
communism.
Government and Opposition 519
After the ‘mourning period’ (1994–7) in which Kim Jong Il gradually took over
power after his father’s death, one can observe a remarkable decrease in the fre-
quency of both nationalist and communist terms. This period encompasses eco-
nomic hardship in North Korea and a devastating famine (Haggard and Noland
2007). During this period, the regime remained largely silent on both legitimacy
claims. The discourse was characterized by slogans about endurance. The mid-
2000s saw a sharp increase in the usage of nationalist terms, which dominate until
today, while reference to communism has declined. In this light, we can see an
adaptation that travels a small distance with late timing and uneven velocity.
In a second step, a keyword in context analysis was conducted. We compare the
10 most frequent terms at the beginning and the end of our observation period
(1981 and 2012) that co-occur in the direct neighbourhood of communist key
terms.7 This allows one to identify the most frequent and therefore most salient
attributes that the joint editorial has attached to communism. As Table 1 sum-
marizes, the most frequent terms in 1981 were: ‘construct’, ‘peopl’, ‘economi’,
‘work’, ‘countri’, ‘nation’ and ‘parti’. In 2012, the most frequent terms surrounding
communist terms were: ‘juch’, ‘kim’, ‘caus’, ‘jong’ and ‘countri’.
The semantic picture that emerges when comparing the 10 most important
terms is one of comparatively strong semantic freezing. One notable difference is
the tendency to personalize communism in 2012 as ‘kim’ and ‘jong’ are the second
and fourth most frequent terms surrounding communist keywords, respectively.
Communism is coupled more tightly to the person of the ruler. Moreover, we
observe a gradual but steady decline of the usage of ‘construct’ over the years.
While being in 1981 by far the most frequent term, its usage in relation to com-
munism has dropped considerably. Besides these two tendencies, downplaying
‘construct’ and emphasizing the person of the ruler, the keywords in communist
context remain by and large unchanged and resemble orthodox ‘communist-
speak’. Terms like ‘countri’, ‘nation’, ‘caus’, ‘life’, ‘great’, ‘will’, ‘way’ are also to a
large extent empty signifiers that do not carry distinguishable and significant
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Figure 2. Frequency of Terms: Communism and Nationalism in North Korea
Source: Own illustration.
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communist key terms in 2012, namely ‘juch’. This is striking. As the discussion
above illustrates, however, this is not old wine in new bottles because in this case
even the bottles are old. Rather than adapting, North Korea retreated into known
and semantically settled concepts. In this light, we cautiously conclude that North
Korea’s semantics on communism have not altered in major ways. The semantic
distance that the ideology travelled in the last decades is relatively small.
We argue that the North Korean regime generally uses the same terms in
conjunction with the communist cause. It is a constant repetition of known content
that aims to install a relatively frozen and unchanging semantic map in the minds
of North Korean citizens. The same holds true using similar analysis with terms
that appear constantly over time in the direct neighbourhood of nationalist legit-
imizing discourse. Table 2 lists the most frequent terms in the direct neighbour-
hood of nationalist keywords. If we compare the language that has been used in
direct connection to nationalism, we do not observe major semantic shifts. Ana-
logously to the communist discourse, the nationalist discourse has remained even
more consistent. The most frequent terms remain references to reunification and
the building/establishing/achieving of a strong economy in the country.
Both nationalist and communist discourses have been by and large frozen in
time. With regard to the four parameters that we introduced above, the observed
experimentations with ideological adaptations in recent years have been: (1) born
Table 1. Most Frequent Words Surrounding Communist
Terms in North Korea
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out of a position of weakness and low autonomy over semantic changes; they were
reactive rather than proactive. Furthermore, the semantic changes have been: (2)
late in timing, (3) at a slow pace and overall (4) relatively limited in scope.
There are striking parallels between North Korea and Cuba as the Cold War
wound down. Both states had charismatic leaders: Kim Il Sung in North Korea and
Fidel Castro in Cuba. Neither communist party was militarily dependent upon the
Soviet Union to maintain power (Dimitrov 2013), but both were reliant on eco-
nomic exchange with other communist states for their prosperity. Similar to North
Korea, the Cuban economy began to experience serious problems in the mid-1980s
that were then compounded by the ultimate disappearance of the Soviet economy
(Brundenius 2009). Like North Korea, Cuba also followed the strategy of freezing
the meanings of its legitimation efforts amidst the changing global context, only
taking measures to adjust its legitimation after conditions had deteriorated to such
an extent that the party felt existentially insecure.
Since taking power in 1959 the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) has always
suffused its ideology with nationalism and patriotic pride, but prior to the 1990s
this was subsumed to an internationalist version of communism and Marxism-
Leninism. Cuba attempted to support revolutions abroad and promoted goals of
international communism by sending troops and/or workers with specialized
expertise to aid socialist construction in other countries (Westad 2005). After the
fall of the Soviet Union, however, the content of Cuba’s ideology emphasized
themes associated with nationalism and sovereignty and downplayed global
Marxism-Leninism (Rabkin 1992). Themes of nationalism and sovereignty could
be found in the Cuban communist tradition previously, but they gained newfound
prominence from the 1990s onwards as the party embarked on a campaign to re-
orient its ideological education strategy (Rojas 2007).
The 1986 Main Report of the Third Congress of the Communist Party is
instructive because it came on the eve of the Soviet collapse. Given that the CPC
did not foresee changes to global communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
this report can be seen as the party’s consensual statement regarding its communist
revolution during a time when it perceived that global communism was more
resilient than it ultimately turned out to be. The document discusses its ‘long-range
economic, scientific and technological cooperation development program between
Cuba and the Soviet Union up to the year 2000’ and its ‘broad coordination of
long-term plans with the socialist countries’ up to the year 2000 (Communist Party
of Cuba 1986: 108, 47). Analysis of international developments in the report make
clear that the CPC not only failed to anticipate the rapid decline of communism,
but fully expected the Soviet Union, with its ‘enormous economic potential, its
unquestionable military might, and its loyalty to the principles of Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism’, to continue to lead the cause of global
communism indefinitely (Communist Party of Cuba 1986: 107).
Far from the economic experimentation and flexibility endorsed by parties in
Vietnam and China during this period, the CPC stuck to an orthodox line in 1986.
The most important ideological and political goal of the party, according to the
1986 report, remained the building of socialism while avoiding the ‘slightest
indication of bourgeois attitudes and corruption’ and thwarting the undisciplined
and selfish ‘petty bourgeois spirit’ (Communist Party of Cuba 1986: 88). The report
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was frank about some of the shortcomings of Cuba’s economy in the previous five
years, but nonetheless looked forward to the period of 1986 to 1990 as one in which
it saw a 5% annual growth rate as ‘feasible thanks to… economic relations with the
socialist countries’ (Communist Party of Cuba 1986: 39).
With hindsight, it is obvious that these targets were not met. Soviet reforms in
the late 1980s ‘were greeted in Havana with mounting disbelief and dismay, and
eventually with open repudiation and rejection’ and Cuba embarked on a policy of
‘rectification’ that reaffirmed the ideological principles that had animated the
revolution since its inception (Perez 1995: 381–387). As Castro put it in 1989, ‘the
first trench in the defense of our country are the ideas, its ideology’ (quoted in
Rabkin 1992: 28).
In August 1990, the party began a process of forced adaptation known as the
‘Special Period in Time of Peace’. The 1991 Party Congress endorsed a degree of
political pluralism as it called for an increase in public debate and consultation
(Cole 2002). Despite this ostensible opening, party control of the public sphere
remained firm (Aguirre 2002), and the government sought to reinvigorate its
legitimation on patriotic and sovereign nationalist grounds. The emphasis on
nationalism resulted in a renewed focus on reconstructed national myths and a
‘battle of ideas’ that aimed to instil patriotism and safeguard sovereignty (Rojas
2007).
The attempt to emphasize sovereignty and independence over Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism came relatively late and still did not
allow for significant policy flexibility or ideological pluralism. The party sought to
de-contest the meanings of sovereignty and independence such that they were
synonymous with rule by the CPC. The prescription was more vigilance and
patriotism against US aggression over communist solidarity. While Cuba
attempted an adaptation, it was not to change the content of what it meant to be
communist but rather a reshuffling of emphasis within its constellation of legit-
imating values.
Towards the ideal type of adaptive legitimation: China and Vietnam
The communist parties of China and Vietnam initiated significant economic
reforms beginning in the late 1970s and mid-1980s, respectively. The crux of the
reforms in each country was to lessen the role of the party-state in the economy
and to provide more space for market mechanisms to operate. On the eve of
reforms, China was emerging from the chaos and fervour of the Cultural Revo-
lution while Vietnam was experiencing acute economic challenges and attempting
post-war reunification. In China reforms that gave more priority to market
mechanisms became possible after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the
solidification of Deng Xiaoping’s rule at the top of the leadership hierarchy from
1978. The death in 1986 of Vietnam’s Le Duan, who had occupied the top party
post for over 25 years and who held orthodox Marxist views (see Vu 2017), allowed
the party more latitude to embark on reforms. In each case market-oriented
reforms contributed to decades of economic growth and revitalization, although
both governments retain significant control over important sectors and enterprises
(Malesky and London 2014).
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Initial reforms in each case were born of the endogenous recognition that the
party would need to deliver increased prosperity to the population in order to
maintain power and legitimacy. The tension, however, was that the proffered
reforms in each case strayed from conservative interpretations of Marxist-Leninist
principles insofar as they called for the party-state to scale back some elements of
central control. In China this was justified by Deng’s arguments that markets and
central control were methods used by both capitalist and communist systems, not
ends in themselves. Vietnam, in the midst of serious economic problems, was ‘by
the late 1980s… torn between clinging to orthodox ideology and moving to a more
open, less centralized economy’ (Turnbull 1999: 308). The Sixth Party Congress in
1986 saw expanded scope for discussions and debates about how to respond to the
country’s dire economic realities and ultimately a programme of doi moi (‘revi-
talization’ or ‘renovation’) was formulated to develop ‘a market economy with a
socialist orientation’ (Thayer 2010: 427). While implementation of reforms laun-
ched in 1986 partially languished until at least 1989 due to conservative resistance,
the scope of ideologically acceptable thinking was nonetheless significantly
expanded in the interim (Elliot 2012: 51–57).
In China, the party studied the collapse of the Soviet Union extensively to distil
lessons from the USSR’s downfall. The adaptation velocity – that is, how fast the
regime learned to learn – has been high. One of the many lessons learned was that
a ‘dogmatic ideology’ was harmful to the party’s resilience (Shambaugh 2008: 4). A
rigid, ossified ideology is thus seen by the CCP as a liability, but it cannot disregard
Marxism-Leninism entirely because too much of its legacy and historical legitimacy
is bound up with it. Since the ascension of Deng the CCP has chosen to ‘finesse and
adapt’ the ideology (Holbig 2013; Shambaugh 2008: 105).
The party’s ideology adapted with changing social conditions but has remained
an indispensable pillar of the CCP’s rule. The CCP has attempted to provide
flexible ideological constructs that can accommodate the changing needs of China
and the party. Concepts like Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents’ helped justify the
inclusion of entrepreneurs into the party while Hu Jintao’s ‘Socialist Harmonious
Society’ called for more regionally balanced economic growth (Brown 2012). Along
with these flexible concepts, it has been widely noted that the CCP has downplayed
Marxism-Leninism and emphasized nationalistic sentiment to help legitimate its
rule. The infusion of nationalism is thought to help identify the CCP with China’s
increasing power and muscular foreign policy, although nationalist discourses can
sometimes be critical of the party if, for example, it is perceived by nationalist
commentators as not standing up sufficiently to Western powers (Seckington
2005).
The party’s documents adopted at the Party Congress, held every five years,
reflect these adaptable currents. Figure 3 shows the absolute frequency of the usage
of nationalist and communist terms over the years. The trend is obvious and
consistent with qualitative case knowledge. Communism – be it in its socialist,
Marxist or revolutionary sense – became downplayed in China. The decrease in the
communist discourse is paralleled with an increase in nationalist terms. Reference
to communism was nearly three times more common than nationalism in 1977 but
only half as frequent in 2012. In contrast to the North Korean case, the Chinese
case displays a clear-cut picture: nationalism rises, communism declines – and this
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for the last 30 years. In China the relationship between the two core concepts of the
ideological ‘macroscopic structural arrangement’ (Freeden 1994: 141) of national
communism has been almost completely reversed. It has adapted to changing
circumstances and has fundamentally changed the composition of its ideological
discourse.
Using the same procedures for measuring co-occurrence as in the North Korean
case, Table 3 shows the most frequent terms associated with Chinese communism
in 1977.8 In the 1970s, communism in China was characterized by revolutionary
appeal. Indeed, ‘revolution’ was the third most salient term. Taken together with
‘socialist’, ‘parti’, ‘line’ and the reference to ‘chairman’ ‘mao’, we interpret these
contextual words semantically as revolutionary zeal and fervour. The picture is
complemented by ‘great’ and ‘struggle’, which refer to an activist language.
The most frequent terms in 2012 stand in stark contrast. While we have seen a
steady decline of communist wording over the years in absolute terms, it is
interesting to note that communism today is associated closely with the nation:
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Figure 3. Frequency of Terms: Communism and Nationalism in China
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of communism has taken place. Moreover, the analysis of keywords in context
shows that the 2012 discourse aims at modifying communism. Terms surrounding
communism today are ‘develop’, ‘improv’, but also the more technocratic ‘system’
and ‘modern’. This pattern signifies a need for reforming old-style communism.
What was perhaps the most surprising term in the neighbourhood of communism
today was the fifth-largest: ‘law’. Communism and law had no connection in the
1970s at all but in 2012 were used with a relative frequency of 10%. This means that
whenever a communist term occurs in the 2012 party line, in 10% of the cases ‘law’
is associated with it. This shows that communism of the 1970s has changed
considerably. Today, party ideologues redefine what communism means in the 21st
century. The picture is complemented by semantic shifts with regard to cultural
and political interpretations of communism – and away from dominantly ideo-
logical and economic understandings.
When it comes to the interpretation of the most frequent terms surrounding
nationalism in China, a similar change can be detected. China has moved from a
revolutionary language in the 1970s in which nationalist keywords were sur-
rounded by the ‘great’ ‘proletarian’ revolution and by ‘socialist’ organs like the
‘armi’, the ‘parti’, the ‘congress’ and ‘committe’. The terms that define Chinese
nationalism in the 21st century differ. More societal aspects are emphasized. While
there is some overlap with the Chinese people, it is surprising to see that ‘respect’,
‘cultur’, and ‘modern’ are among the most frequent terms in 2012 that define the
meaning of nationalism. There is a remarkable shift in the nationalist discourse.
Table 4 displays this semantic shift.
While North Korea tended towards the freeze-frame ideal type, the Chinese case is
more reflective of a flexible adaptation strategy. When comparing the 10 most frequent
terms at the beginning and at the end of our observation period, the terms change
drastically. But it is not only the frequency of these terms, but also the semantic
meanings that they carry. While the former language was one of revolutionary passion,
today’s language aims at correcting, modifying and modernizing communism.
With regard to the four parameters of ideological analysis introduced previously
(autonomy over the process, timing, velocity and distance), the Chinese govern-
ment has actively coped with the changing national and international situation.
The CCP did so early and learned to learn very quickly. In this sense, the adap-
tations made by the CCP have been more creative and enabling rather than the
Table 4. Most Frequent Words Surrounding Nationalist Terms in China
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‘life-sustaining’ reactive adaptations made by Cuba and North Korea. China
retained relative autonomy over the adaptation process and travelled so far that the
ratio between communism and nationalism reversed.
Turning our attention to Vietnam, changes in the party’s documents adopted at
the National Congress, held every five years, reflect the Vietnam Communist
Party’s (VCP) ideological adaptability. The Fifth Party Congress, held in 1982, took
place amid serious economic troubles and ongoing war with Cambodia. The
Central Committee report to the VCP called for an application of Marxism-
Leninism to the conditions of Vietnam (Vietnam Communist Party 1982: 11) while
asserting that ‘collective mastery is the greatest, the finest and loftiest feature of
man’ (Vietnam Communist Party 1982: 27). Patriotism was synonymous with
socialism (Vietnam Communist Party 1982: 28), while cooperation with the Soviet
Union, which was ‘advancing vigorously’ as the ‘pillar’ of the worldwide com-
munist movement, was a ‘manifestation of revolutionary sentiments’ (Vietnam
Communist Party 1982: 42–46).
By 1986 Vietnam’s economy was in worse shape and, as mentioned above, the
death of Le Duan that year facilitated a wider scope for debate within the party.
The 1986 Sixth VCP Congress resolution and political report revealed more
adaptability in the face of changing circumstances. The resolution admitted that
plans for the previous five years had not been met (Vietnam Communist Party
1986: 2), and acknowledged serious shortcomings in its ideological perspectives
(Vietnam Communist Party 1986: 19). The party needed to remind itself of ‘the
idea of regarding the people as the base’ and had to ‘first of all renovate its
perceptions and thinking’ in order to stabilize the economy and improve the living
conditions of the population (Vietnam Communist Party 1986: 20). Although the
report still lauded the Soviet Union, it also recognized new scientific and tech-
nological advances in the world (Vietnam Communist Party 1986) and called for
Vietnam to ‘combine the strength of the nation with the strength of the era’
(Vietnam Communist Party 1986: 8).
The initial stages of the disintegration of the Soviet Union were met with
confusion and sharp debate within the party’s elite (Elliot 2012: 59–85; see also Vu
2017: 252–258). They vigorously debated how the party ought to legitimize its rule.
In open letters, public speeches, party meetings, essays and manifestos, a group of
communist intellectuals and leaders ‘criticized the continued salience of ideology
and the party’s closed undemocratic decision-making process’ (Thayer 2010: 429).
Conservatives who opposed further political liberalization responded to these
challenges and seemed to overcome their initial paralysis in reacting to develop-
ments elsewhere in the communist world.
The 1991 Party Congress elected a leadership that was staunchly Leninist in its
political outlook but technocratic and market-oriented in its economic outlook,
which suggests that the party was seeking to augment the foundations of its per-
formance legitimation (see London 2009: 387–388). After the fall of the Soviet
Union, the more flexible legitimation formulas previously codified by the VCP in
the mid- to late 1980s meant that, despite initial confusion and disarray in response
to the collapse, the VCP had the necessary material to adapt its legitimation swiftly
to new realities. The 1991 Congress legitimized the idea of a socialist market
economy (Pike 1992), which would have been more difficult to do without the
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foundation laid by the 1986 Congress. The difficulties in other socialist states were
attributed in 1991 not to any shortcomings of socialism itself but rather to sub-
version by ‘international reactionary forces’ (Vietnam Communist Party 1991: 14).
Yet at the same time the document distanced itself from wholly embracing
international communism by stressing that the socialist goals for Vietnam were
those chosen by Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam Communist Party 1991: 17), thus high-
lighting the nationalistic credentials of the VCP over universalist aspirations. The
Congress affirmed Marxism-Leninism and rejected multiparty democracy but
noted that ‘what is new in the documents of this party congress is that together
with Marxism-Leninism, the party upholds Ho Chi Minh’s thought’ (Vietnam
Communist Party 1991: 22). The foundations for this move had been laid pre-
viously as the promotion of ‘Ho Chi Minh Thought’ starting in the mid-1980s was
an attempt to lend the contemporary party some of ‘Uncle Ho’s’ charismatic
legitimacy (Thayer 2010: 427).
These developments allowed for a ‘creative’ application of socialist principles to
the ‘specific conditions’ of Vietnam. The VCP directly acknowledged its strategy of
ideological adaptability at the Seventh Congress, noting not only its creative
application of socialist principles, but also admitting that ‘of course, our current
concepts – though they are correct today – will be supplemented and developed
tomorrow, together with the development of reality, thought, and theory’ (Vietnam
Communist Party 1991: 17).
By the 1996 Eighth Congress, the VCP looked back on nearly a decade of reform
and stressed that it was not abandoning socialism, but that its policy of doi moi ‘is a
combination of persistence in revolutionary principles and strategy, on the one hand,
with tactical flexibility and creativity and a quick grasp of the new on the other’
(Vietnam Communist Party 1996: 26). While socialism was in a difficult period,
‘mankind is still in the era of transition from capitalism to socialism’ and ‘national
struggle and class struggle continue to unfold in diverse forms’ (Vietnam Com-
munist Party 1996: 33). While the velocity, the timing and the ideological distance
may lag behind the Chinese model, the VCP has clearly displayed a proactive and
adaptable approach to legitimation. On balance, this has enhanced the autonomous
capacities for further adaptation instead of being merely life sustaining.
Conclusion
This article has analysed four communist regimes and argued that they took one of
two paths to legitimate themselves in a post-communist world. Our aim was not to
provide a full explanation of why these regimes have weathered times of ideological
crises, but rather how they did so. While all four governments under examination
were characterized by some version of national communism, their emphasis on
constituent concepts changed over time. The cases under study can be placed on
the continuum of different legitimation strategies that range from the ideal types of
freeze-framing and adaptation.
We introduced four parameters that help to distinguish ideological changes
empirically (autonomy over semantic changes, timing, velocity and the distance
that an ideology travels) and applied them to the remaining communist regimes.
North Korea made minimal adaptations and is a case closer to the pole of freezing
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semantics, while Cuba was a cautious, but late mover. Neither acted out of a
position of strength and their adaptations can be described as rather reactive to the
demise of communism. In contrast, China and Vietnam proactively emphasized
nationalism, development, national power and ideological flexibility, and down-
played themes associated with a more rigid adherence to communism – with China
being unparalleled when it comes to velocity, distance and autonomy over the
adaptation process. China and Vietnam therefore had more flexible but sturdier
foundations of legitimation in a world of fewer communist regimes than did North
Korea and Cuba, both of which emphasized the role of the regime in safeguarding
national sovereignty in a suddenly hostile world. The result in the latter two cases is
a legitimation formula that has helped each party stay in power but that has been
less able to incorporate dynamism and flexibility.
While our aim was not to determine causality, our working hypothesis to
explain divergent legitimation trajectories revolves around the longevity of
founding leaders in each case. Communist political systems facilitate the emer-
gence of personalist leaders due to the lack of institutionalized checks and balances
(McAdams 2017). Each of the four cases here featured charismatic and influential
founding figures. In the two cases closer to the freeze-frame pole, those figures
lived past the Soviet collapse, with Kim Il Sung dying in 1994 and Fidel Castro in
2016. The presence of the founding figures of each communist movement made it
more difficult for the system to distance itself from his ideas until late in the game,
thus impacting in particular the timing and distance of ideological changes. In the
two cases closer to the adaptation pole, charismatic founding leaders were long
gone by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, which helped ease constraints on
ideological adaptation. In China, Mao’s death in 1976 ultimately paved the way for
a degree of liberalization. In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh died in 1969 and while Le
Duan was the dominant political figure after Ho’s death, he did not have the latter’s
charisma. In any case he also died in 1986, which helped the VCP adapt afterwards.
Our analysis ends in 2012, but as of this writing, each communist party remains
in power. Vietnam and China have continued to emphasize the nationalist elements
of national communism. However, China has seen the re-emergence of personality
cult dynamics in the form of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’. The ‘Core Socialist Values’ that
accompany ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ stress themes similar to the core of nationalism, so
we are likely to see an intensification of China’s nationalist-leaning national com-
munism. In Cuba the death of Fidel has allowed his brother Raul to de-emphasize
international communism and instead focus on reform and domestic performance.
Time will tell how far the Cuban party will travel from Fidel’s ideas, but the lea-
dership turnover has allowed a degree of change. In North Korea, dynastic rule
continues under Kim Jong Un, who has emphasized economic well-being and
limited marketization while retaining the nationalist core of North Korean ideology.
Finally, this article not only has relevance for understanding the four commu-
nist regimes under examination, but it also bears on broader debates in the
comparative study of authoritarianism. It foregrounds ideology and legitimation
and thereby adds to prevailing explanations in the literature on authoritarianism
that emphasize institutions and repression. Research on autocratic legitimation is
burgeoning in case studies (Dukalskis and Hooker 2011; Gill 2011; Holbig 2013)
and comparative research designs (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014; Kailitz and
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Stockemer 2017). In conjunction with the rich insights from the renaissance in
studying political ideologies in general (Freeden 2007; Maynard and Mildenberger
2018) this article contributes to a newly vibrant field by developing a theoretical
framework that can be applied beyond communist-style states.
Supplementary material. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/gov.2018.40.
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Notes
1 Laos is excluded from this analysis for reasons of space and data availability.
2 Originally, Freeden (1996) introduces a tripartite distinction between core, adjacent and peripheral
elements. In the following, we only make use of the broader distinction between an ideological core and
adjacent elements.
3 Political scientists have adopted quantitative text analysis with vigour (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013;
Roberts et al. 2014). While recognizing that there are more complex methods available to analyse large text
corpora, we rely on a relatively simple supervised frequency count and keywords-in-context approach as it
is suitable to our small corpora and deductive theoretical framework.
4 In line with most studies that use this approach, we have set the direct neighbourhood to three words
before and after the key words.
5 In line with our theoretical argument and following the ideological essence of communism and
nationalism identified by Brown (2013) and Vincent (2013) (see Figure 1), the key terms for communism
are Marxism, socialism, party, solidarity, equality, planning and ownership. The key terms for nationalism
are independence, sovereignty, performance, prosperity, development, stability, order and culture.
6 The word length of the joint editorials is comparable.
7 In the online appendix to this study, we present the ‘career’ of the most frequent keywords in context.
This shows the development of the most frequent terms surrounding nationalism and communism in
North Korea over time.
8 In the online appendix, we present the ‘career’ of the most frequent keywords in context. This shows the
development of the most frequent terms surrounding nationalism and communism in China.
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